Inflation targets have clarified the objectives of monetary policy. An objective was to ensure the public would be able to more easily assess monetary policy performance based on the Bank of Canada's record at achieving low and stable inflation.
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Introduction
Accountability in monetary policy creates expectations of greater transparency. A central bank charged with meeting a stipulated inflation objective is expected, or may be required, to account for its actions once the government has set the objective, ideally with the consent and support of the monetary authority. Transparency assists the central bank in building credibility. As the Governor of the Bank of Canada stated recently, the trust that is gained via greater transparency "…can be thought of as a kind of social capital -a shared asset that benefits everyone, including the central bank" (Dodge 2002) . The demand for greater transparency is also a reflection of the desire by financial markets especially, but not exclusively, for more information about what the central bank does and why. A dilemma for the central bank is that the horizon for financial markets is very short (e.g., daily or even tick by tick) while the mandate of central banks with inflation targets is based on observations that are available far more infrequently (i.e., monthly, or even quarterly). One way central banks have responded is by making more frequent statements about their policies and outlook for the future. There is a danger, however, that such statements can inadvertently mislead and potentially jeopardize the central bank's credibility and its ability to reach a stated objective. An example is the previous habit of the US Federal Reserve to announce the direction of the "bias" in future funds rate changes. The practice was discontinued in late 1999, replaced by a "balance of risks assessment" that is explicitly not to be taken as an indicator of future Fed actions. Alan Greenspan, Chair of the Board of Governors, recognized that the Fed's approach had been "… subject to differing expectations." (Stevenson 1999) .
1 This paper offers a
Canadian example illustrating the same danger. The upshot is that efforts at increasing the transparency of central bank operations can come into conflict with the clarity with which it can communicate its policies to the public.
If the twin goals of greater accountability and transparency benefit monetary policy, then one would expect public commentary about the central bank to reflect the change. An obvious question then is whether, as a former Governor of the Bank of Canada stated, "… with a clearer objective, public commentary on monetary policy since 1991 has involved fairer assessments of the performance of the Bank of Canada" (Thiessen (1999) , p. 97, emphasis added). The Governor did not explain what he meant by the subjective term "fair". However, he adds: "…financial market uncertainties in
Canada have been less than they would have been without targets" (Thiessen 1998, 9) .
Comments such as these reflect the importance attached to public commentary and financial market reactions to policy decisions made by the Bank of Canada (also see Dodge 2002) .
Using a variety of data, including public commentary, this paper examines the impact of changes in transparency and accountability at the Bank of Canada over the last decade. The period covers a sample when inflation reduction and control targets were put into place. An attempt is then made to empirically determine the impact of various The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, a brief review the role of accountability and transparency in central banking is presented in section 2. Next, efforts by the Bank of Canada to improve its communications strategy, and reduce the element of surprise in policy-making, are described in section 3. Data used to evaluate financial markets' assessments of Bank of Canada policies are described in section 4 prior to a discussion, in section 5, of more formal evidence dealing with the impact of greater central bank accountability and transparency that also relies on a comparison with the UK experience. Section 6 concludes.
Central Bank Transparency and Accountability in Theory and in Practice
Transparency and accountability are often seen as complementary goals. Some authors have suggested that a central bank need not be transparent yet remain accountable. A significant difficulty is that there is no consensus yet on the precise meaning of both terms. Theoretical approaches and implications of accountability and transparency in central banking are also varied. Siklos (2002, chapter 6 ) defines accountability to include the precision with which the objectives of monetary policy are stated. How monetary policy decisions are made, that is, the governance of the central bank, may also play a role, and the question is taken up when the decision-making structure of the Bank of Canada is compared with the one in place at the Bank of England. Transparency is a function of the quantity, type, and clarity, of information provided to the public. As the Deutsche Bundesbank (2000, 17) states: "Transparency … plays the part of self-imposed commitment: by disclosing the basis of the policy decisions, the central bank enables the general public to assess their adequacy…"
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The lack of consensus is evident from the contradictory findings in the literature. BHK; 1996) find that more accountable central banks are also more transparent.
De Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1999) focus on the location of responsibility for the ultimate objectives of monetary policy, and find a positive association between accountability and central bank independence (also see Eijffinger, Hoebrichts, and Schalling 1998, 2000) . 4 Nevertheless, in contrast to BHK (1996) , they find that more autonomous central banks are somewhat less transparent and are less accountable for monetary policy outcomes. However, in reaching this conclusion, they assume that a central bank with a credibility problem (e.g., New Zealand, Canada) must, by definition, be more transparent than a central bank already enjoying a high reputation among the public for maintaining low and stable inflation. This is almost certainly a misinterpretation of the activities of, for example, the Bundesbank (Posen 2000) or the Federal Reserve. The Bundesbank has consistently and clearly made its policy positions known to both governments and the public in a wide variety of fora and publications so that, by the standards of many central banks today, it appears to have been rather transparent.
Turning to the US Fed's case, its penchant, in the past, for releasing too little information about its actions and outlook has been widely reported (e.g., Goodfriend 1986 ). Yet, it is rather more open than many other central banks, in part due to
Congressional supervision, and a shift in 1994 toward announcing the outcome of meetings of its principal policy-making committee, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Nevertheless, while it is possible for a central bank to be accountable without being transparent, there is skepticism that the first requirement can be maintained over time without the other. Table 1 provides a chronology of changes in accountability and transparency at the Bank of Canada since 1991.
Inflation Targets in the 1990s
Former Governor John Crow, and then Minister of Finance Michael Wilson, agreed to inflation reduction targets as part of the 1991 federal budget. These were meant to be transitional on the way to eventual inflation control targets. Originally, the target for the rate of change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was set as a range of 2-4% to be met by the end of 1992, thereafter lowered to 1.5-3.5% by mid-1994. As inflation fell quickly, the target was revised downward in December 1993 to a range of 1-3%, where it remains to this day, and is referred to as an inflation control objective. Price stability has never been formally defined and deadlines for doing so in 1995, 1998, and 2001 , that is, each time the inflation targets were renewed, came and went. Nevertheless, the Bank interpreted numerical inflation objectives as signaling a greater need for public accountability and transparency. Curiously, the need for greater transparency seems to have originated with the Bank of Canada, not from the government or Parliament (Crow 1994 ) while the first steps taken to require inflation reduction targets apparently came from the government (Crow 2002, chapter 8) . The Bank of Canada Act was not amended largely because the Manley Report (Canada 1992) Canada 1998, and www.bankofcanada.ca/glossaagr.htm), reflects the combined effect of a short-term interest rate (90 day commercial paper rate) and an exchange rate (a tradedweighted index). The appeal of the MCI is understandable since, in a small open economy, relative changes in these two variables can signal not only future inflation but provide an indication of the current stance of monetary policy. However, since the (nominal) MCI can be evaluated on a daily basis there is the danger that financial markets expect the Bank of Canada to react to every "wiggle" in the index though it has strenuously denied this possibility (e.g., Freedman 1995, and Bank of Canada 1995 ; also see Siklos 2001, and Eika, Ericsson and Nymoen 1996) . Simple indicators may be useful for policy discussions at the highest levels of decision-making at the central bank, but they raise the possibility that markets will place too great a weight on their day-to-day movements.
12 Perhaps more importantly, fluctuations in the MCI say nothing about whether changes in the exchange rate originate from the international movement of capital or are due to the foreign exchange market's assessment of the fundamentals driving the Canadian economy.
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As noted earlier, a central bank communicates more than through monetary policy announcements. How such announcements are explained to the public also matters a great deal. Having adopted a target for the operating band, the Bank of Canada, until late 2000, chose to issue a press release only when the target was changed, and not to "speak" There have been no additional discount rate changes in the US since.
Implications for Financial Markets and Inflation
Presumably, greater transparency and accountability increase the awareness of financial markets and the public about the aims and limitations of monetary policy, thereby enhancing the credibility of the central bank. Therefore, conditional on these changes, greater transparency should contribute to generating less volatility and uncertainty in financial markets since theory would suggest that only the surprise element in policies affects asset prices. Therefore, measures aimed at improving transparency (together with greater accountability) increase the stock of "social capital" that the present Governor of the Bank of Canada refers to in describing the advantages of the current monetary policy strategy.
14 Clearly, the adoption of inflation targets, an expression of greater accountability, ought to contribute to maintaining inflation expectations within the target range.
Nevertheless, measures that enhance transparency, together with greater accountability for maintaining the jointly agreed upon inflation objectives, must also independently contribute to better anchoring inflation expectations as well as reducing the significance and size of inflation forecast errors. Muller and Zelmer (1999), and Haldane (1997) propose a simple test of transparency by examining the response of daily interest rate changes across the term structure conditional on several determinants. These include: changes in the exchange rate and changes in central bank interest rates. Perfect transparency requires that changes in interest rates contain no element of "surprise" to financial markets. Both Muller and Zelmer (1999) , and Haldane (1997) governance structures within each of these central banks affecting the responsibility for communicating monetary policy decisions to the public. An airing of differences in views about the future economic outlook ought to contribute to enhancing transparency by providing more information about the menu of policy options being considered by the central bank. Such a policy can also serve to increase accountability by preventing decision makers from hiding behind a committee's compromise position. The failure to provide this information leads to the presumption that there is always a consensus about future monetary policy actions, an unlikely proposition.
The notion that the publication of a diversity of views increases uncertainty is unconvincing because it is almost always the case that disagreements among MPC members are expressed in finely balanced terms (Blinder et. al. 2001 
Outline of the Tests and the Data
First, the impact of measures to improve accountability and transparency on private sector inflation forecasts are considered in a cross-country setting. The adoption of numerical inflation targets is a fairly recent phenomenon. Data from Australia, Sweden, New Zealand, Spain, the UK, countries that formally target inflation, as well as data from Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the US, are used. The latter countries have an exemplary record of inflation over the last few decades but have not formally targeted inflation nor have there been any noticeable changes in their monetary policy strategy. 16 Hence, these countries act as the control group in our test to determine the sources of variation in inflation expectations. Furthermore, the crosscountry setting implicitly allows us to control for the fact that during the sample considered, the disinflation period followed by more stable inflation rates was a phenomenon pervasive in the whole industrial world and could not have taken place 
Empirical Results
Transparency, Accountability, and Inflation Forecasts
The first issue examined is whether the release of inflation reports influences private sector forecasts of inflation and whether there are any noticeable differences between countries that formally target inflation versus other major central banks with historically strong inflation records but no numerical inflation objectives and no significant change in emphasis toward more accountability or transparency.
Regressions were estimated in a panel setting to assess whether private sector The results in Table 3A reveal that inflation reports, a common device introduced by the mid 1990s in the inflation targeting countries, significantly reduced forecasts of inflation after 1995. The adoption of inflation targets, also has a negative impact on forecasts of inflation. Hence, panel estimates suggest that these types of policy initiatives can play a significant role in influencing inflationary expectations. provide a definitive account why, even if the bias in inflation forecasts has fallen significantly in inflation targeting countries, they at times miss by a lot.
Daily Data
An increase in monetary policy transparency ought to reduce uncertainty about central bank behavior. A convenient measure of uncertainty is kurtosis. The value of kurtosis rises with the area in the tail of a distribution. As the tails of a distribution become "fatter", the likelihood of extreme outcomes increases as this indicates that markets raise their expectations of, for example, sharply higher interest rates or a large currency depreciation.
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Popular measures of volatility and uncertainty in financial asset prices are derived from the market for options. Options represent the right, but not the obligation, to buy a financial asset in the future. Hence, the prices for such instruments can be informative about the likelihood financial markets attach to some price at a future date. The implied volatility (IV) is the volatility measure of the underlying asset price. Kurtosis, also derived from the distribution of these same options, therefore provides information about uncertainty of extreme future outcomes. IVs increase marginally relative to the full IT period, an indication that they contain little in the way of an element of surprise to financial markets.
Uncertainty of extreme outcomes, as measured by kurtosis, has generally fallen since overnight interest rate targets were used to signal the Bank of Canada's policy stance. Around the release of MPRs there is a rise in the likelihood of extreme outcomes.
Perhaps this is a reflection of the uncertainty about the extent to which the document reflects the Bank's own outlook. However, kurtosis falls if we exclude the period of the Asian crisis. It is possible that this event served to permanently increase uncertainty in financial markets though the evidence in Table 4 is not conclusive on this score.
Turning to UK evidence, changes in the repo rate are usually associated with lower IV, relative to the full IT sample. Of more interest, however, is the finding that volatility is lower when MPC minutes reveal a split in the committee than when a unanimous decision is taken. Therefore, it would appear that the airing of a diversity of opinion within the MPC meetings, as proxied by committee voting patterns, does not harm financial market volatility. 23 It should be noted that changes in the overnight operating band in Canada and the repo rate in the UK tend to be clustered in time, as are split and unanimous committee decisions (not shown). These considerations may also have indirectly influenced market sentiment about monetary policy uncertainty in a manner not directly accounted for in the results shown in Table 4 .
Conditional Interest Rate Changes
Estimates of the impact of greater monetary policy transparency on interest rate changes are provided in Tables 5A and 5B . They are based on specification used by Muller and Zelmer (1999) , and Haldane (1997) , augmented by a richer set of public and central bank announcement data. More importantly, the sample includes observations after inflation reduction targets were replaced with inflation control targets. Hence, transparency itself, and not the adoption of inflation targets, must be responsible for the results since credibility had been earned by 1994. The estimated specification relying on Canadian data is of the form:
where Spread is the US-Canada interest rate spread (at the 3 month and 10 year terms), long end of the term structure, that is, precisely for the horizon that is most likely to reflect changes in inflationary expectations. There is also evidence that, with a one-day lag, the release of the MPR reduces the US-CAN interest rate spread at the 10-year term.
Interestingly, news reports about Bank of Canada policies in the Globe also contribute to reduce the spread at the short-end of the term structure while the combined impact of the FP and Globe accounts is statistically insignificant at the longer maturity horizon.
Individually, however, GM announcements contribute to lower spreads while FP announcements have the opposite impact. Hence, the press' interpretation of Bank of Canada policies has, it seems, only short-run effects.
By way of comparison, Table 5B repeats the same exercise using UK data since the creation of the Bank of England's MPC. The specification is largely the same as in the case where Canadian data are used, although we have fewer observations for the sample that includes the NEWS series (FT) taken from Hofmann (1999) . Accordingly, we provide estimates covering two samples. However, unlike the Canadian case, we also allow for the impact of MPC meetings according to voting outcomes. In other words, separate coefficients are estimated for the cases where the outcome of voting is close, unanimous, or when there is no change in the repo rate. The results reveal that, as in the Canadian case, changes in the official rate reduce both short and long spreads, regardless of the chosen sample. The outcome of MPC voting generally appears to have no impact on any of the spreads with the exception of the sample ending in May 2001. In that one case, a close vote raises the short term spread. Notice also that any impact of changes in the repo rate are offset by the interaction of interest rate changes and the holding of MPC meetings which here substitute for Bank of Canada statements used in Table 5A . There appears to be little evidence that the MPC structure of delivering monetary policy decisions harms the spread at either the short or long end of the maturity structure while the interaction of MPC meetings and repo rate announcements have reduced the spread by a relatively greater amount than the comparable coefficient using Canadian data.
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the role played by measures to increase the transparency and accountability of monetary policy actions in Canada. It was argued that these developments lead to a reduction in financial market volatility and uncertainty.
Additionally, the introduction of inflation targeting, a proxy for accountability, and the publication of an inflation report, a measure of transparency, on private sector forecasts of inflation was also considered. Empirical evidence suggests that greater accountability and transparency have been beneficial in Canada, the UK, and in other inflation targeting countries. While more transparency and accountability are desirable features of central bank operations, clarity in communicating the policy stance is crucial. In particular, providing too much information can be as damaging as providing no information at all.
A comparison with the recent UK experience, including the publication of fully articulated inflation forecasts, and the publication of the voting record of the members of the MPC, reveal no harmful effects from the adoption of this strategy. Hence, it may be worthwhile for Canada to consider a version of the UK model (also see House of Lords 2001, and Kohn 2001) . This would, of course, require changes to the existing Bank of Canada Act to enshrine the inflation objectives that the government be responsible for setting, and formally shift responsibility for monetary policy to a committee. Since the current strategy for delivering monetary policy in Canada already has such elements it is 23 worthwhile asking again why fix something that is not broken? Under current circumstances, there would appear to be no need to do so. However, as Crow (2002) and Siklos (2002) point out, such undertakings are meant to protect society not in "ordinary" times but to ensure a successful outcome in a time of crisis. The Coyne affair of the early 1960s and, to a lesser extent, the experiences of the early and late 1980s make the point. to Andrew Clare of the Bank of England for assistance with the UK data, and to Citibank for the UK implied volatilities data. The Editor, the former Editor, an Associate Editor, and four referees, provided very helpful comments that greatly improved the paper. An appendix, with results not shown in the paper, is available at www.wlu.ca/~wwsbe/faculty/psiklos/home.htm.
ENDNOTES
1.
Nevertheless, Thornton and Wheelock (2000) could not find any predictive content between the direction of bias and subsequent changes in the fed funds rate.
2. Siklos (2002, Table 6 .3) presents a ranking of central bank transparency at the end of the 1990s in 20 industrialized countries. The Bank of England ranks first, the Bank of Canada fourth. A positive and robust correlation between the measures of accountability and transparency is also found.
3.
See, inter alia, Cukierman (2000) , Briault, Haldane and King (1996) , Eijffinger, Hoebrichts and Schaling (1998 ), de Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1999 ), Walsh (2000 , and Siklos (2002) .
4.
A related issue, not addressed here, is whether the democratic legitimacy of an autonomous central bank is enhanced via greater accountability and transparency.
5.
In the index of transparency referred to earlier (see n.1), the Fed ranks second, the Bundesbank seventh. Perhaps the most widely circulated article dealing with the controversy was written by Paul Krugman, published in The Economist (7 September 1996) . In the Canadian context, see Fortin (1996) , Howitt (1997) , and Freedman and Macklem (1998) .
10.
Laidler and Aba (2000) 
11.
www.bank-banque-canada.ca/english/backgrounders/bg-e2.htm. Indeed, central banks that do publish forecasts are at pains to point out that these are conditional, for example, on unchanged interest rates or exchange rates. Therefore, any forecast is but a point within an interval whose width is determined in part by uncertainty about future economic shocks.
12.
The Bank of Canada's November 1996 Monetary Policy Report, in describing the MCI, stated: "…, for convenience, the Bank focuses on the nominal MCI because it can be updated daily" (p. 21).
13. Crow (2002, 120) admits this much when he states that the publicity given to the MCI represents one of several "…commendable efforts at increasing transparency…". However, the release of this series "…led to confusion instead of clarity, and increasing clarity is, after all, what transparency has to be about."
14.
Since greater transparency is also the result of an increase in the volume of information made public, this could lead to greater volatility in asset prices (especially if this is accomplished at the expense of less clarity). However, to the extent that more openness translates into fewer policy "surprises", the net effect should be to enhance prospects for financial stability via lower volatility and uncertainty.
15.
While the publicity given to a diversity of views is thought to be a helpful in 
17.
We use the three-month eurorate although Muller and Zelmer (1999) , for example, use the 90 day Bankers' acceptance rate. The two yields follow each other extremely closely and none of the inferences were affected by the choice of the eurorate.
18. Hofmann (1999) collects press reports from the top five UK newspapers and presents some descriptive evidence to determine whether, in interpreting the 
20.
Note that the standard deviation of inflation forecast errors fell over the 1990s in all countries, except Switzerland, reflecting the well-known connection between (falling) inflation levels and (falling) inflation volatility.
21.
A normal distribution (e.g., see Mills (1999, chapter 5 ) has a kurtosis value of 3.
Excess kurtosis, that is, a distribution with fatter tails than for the Normal distribution, is then defined as an estimate that is in excess of 3. A kurtosis value of less than 3 signifies a distribution with lighter tails than for the Normal. Renewal of 1-3% inflation target for 5 years. Clarification of core inflation as the operational guide for monetary policy.
Sources: Murray, Zelmer and McManus (1996) , Muller and Zelmer (1999) , and www.bankofcanada.ca. Notes: @ signifies statistically significant at the 5% level (* at the 10% level, + at the 1% level) are shown in bold. π t is the inflation rate in CPI, at time t evaluated as (100 times log CPI t -log CPI t-4 )).
f t π is the forecast of inflation (annualized) for year t, made during the calendar year t-1. Data are monthly (see text). Inflation Report is a dummy variable set to 1 in the month the report is released. All estimates are obtained with GLS (using cross-section weights) and corrected standard errors are shown. The 11 countries in the sample are: Australia, Canada, Sweden, USA, Germany, Switzerland, New Zealand, Spain, UK, Austria, and the Netherlands. The inflation targeting countries are: Australia, Canada, Sweden, New Zealand, Spain, and the UK. Note: See notes to Table 4A . Prior to May 6 th 1997, official interest rates were set by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consultation with the Governor. Thereafter, the Bank of England obtained operational independence to set interest rates. n.a. means that FT data were unavailable for the longer sample.
